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Abstract
We consider secure computation of randomized functions between two users, where both the users (Alice and
Bob) have inputs, Alice sends a message to Bob over a rate-limited, noise-free link, and then Bob produces the
output. We study two cases: (i) when privacy condition is required only against Bob, who tries to learn more about
Alice’s input from the message than what can be inferred by his own input and output, and (ii) when there is no
privacy requirement. For both the problems, we give single-letter expressions for the optimal rates. For the first
problem, we also explicitly characterize securely computable randomized functions when input has full support,
which leads to a much simpler expression for the optimal rate. Recently, Data (ISIT 2016) studied the remaining
two cases (first, when privacy conditions are against both the users; and second, when privacy condition is only
against Alice) and obtained single-letter expressions for optimal rates in both the scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two-user secure computation allows mutually distrusting users to jointly perform computation of their
private data interactively, in such a way that no individual learns anything beyond the function value. The
study of secure computation was initiated in [1], [2], [3], [4], etc., under computational assumptions, and
culminated in a surprising result that, every function (both deterministic and randomized) can be securely
computed. However, it turns out that not all two-user functions are computable with information-theoretic
security. A combinatorial characterization of securely computable two-user deterministic functions (with
perfect security), along-with a generic round-optimal secure protocol, was given in [5], [6]. Maji et al.
[7], among other things, characterized deterministic functions that have (statistically) secure protocols.
An alternative characterization (for perfect security) was given by Narayan et al. [8] using common
randomness generated by deterministic secure protocols. A characterization of securely sampleable joint
distributions (in terms of Wyner commom information [9]) was given in [10], and of securely computable
functions, when communication is public and privacy of the function value is against an eavesdropper,
was given in [11].
Interestingly, characterization for securely computable randomized functions is still not known. Kilian
[12], among many other things, gave a characterization when both the users have inputs and only Bob
produces the output. Data [13] studied two variations of the same problem (one with privacy against both
the users, and other with privacy only against Alice) with a probability distribution on inputs and gave
rate-optimal codes for both the problems in perfect security as well as in asymptotic security settings.
In this paper we study the remaining two cases (one with privacy only against Bob, and the other with
no privacy), and give rate-optimal codes for both the problems in asymptotic security setting, when only
one-sided communication from Alice to Bob is allowed. Proofs in this paper differ in significant ways
from that of [13]. We also give explicit characterization of securely computable randomized functions
(where inputs have full support), for the case when privacy is only against Bob, which leads to a much
simpler expression for the optimal rate. Note that Ortiksky and Roche [14] studied the same problem for
deterministic function computation with no privacy and gave a rate-optimal code, but their proofs do not
seem to generalize to the randomized function setting that we consider in this paper.
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Fig. 1 A secure computation problem is described by (pXY , pZ|XY ): Alice and Bob get Xn and Y n, respectively, as their inputs, where
(Xi, Yi)’s are i.i.d. according to pXY , and Bob wants to securely compute Zn according to pZn|XnY n(zn|xn, yn) = Πni=1pZ|XY (zi|xi, yi).
Users have access to private randomness. In any secure code, Alice sends a message M over a rate-limited, noise-free link to Bob, and
based on (M,Y n) Bob produces Zˆn as his output, such that the following conditions are satisfied when block-length tends to infinity: (i)
the L1-distance between the induced distribution pXnY nZˆn and the desired distribution pXnY nZn goes to zero, and (ii) the average amount
of additional information Bob learns about Xn from the message M goes to zero. We also study this problem when there is no privacy,
i.e., purely from the (randomized) function computation point of view. There are no external adversaries/eavesdroppers.
The techniques used in our achievability proofs were developed by Yassaee, Aref, and Gohari [15],
who, along with several new results, also gave alternative and, arguably, simpler proofs for many well-
studied problems in network information theory, including channel synthesis problems. Cuff [16] used a
different tool (soft-covering lemma) to synthesize a memoryless channel with the help of communication
and common randomness. Our problem can be viewed as a generalization of channel synthesis problem
with privacy. Both [15] and [16] studied several security related problems (secret key generation, wiretap
channels, etc.), but all of them guarantee privacy against an eavesdropper. The focus of this paper is on
secure computation (where there is no eavesdropper and we want privacy against the users themselves),
which is fundamentally different from secure communication or secret key agreement (where we want
privacy against an eavesdropper).
This paper is organized as follows: in Section II we formally define two problems (one with privacy, and
the other one without privacy) and state our main theorems for the optimal rate-expressions. In Section III
we prove the first theorem (one with privacy). We also explicitly characterize securely computable
randomized functions when inputs have full support, which leads to a more explicit expression for the
optimal rate. Using this characterization we give a direct achievability using the Slepian-Wolf coding
scheme, along with a much simpler argument of its correctness and privacy.
Notation. For n ∈ N, we write [n] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. We write capital letters P,Q,
etc., to denote random p.m.f.’s and small letters p, q, etc., to denote non-random p.m.f.’s. The total
variation distance between two p.m.f.’s pU and qU on the same alphabet U is defined by ‖pU − qU‖1 :=
1
2
∑
u∈U |pU(u) − qU(u)|. For any two sequences of random p.m.f.’s (PU(n))n∈N and (QU(n))n∈N (where
for every n ∈ N, U (n) takes values in U (n), which is an arbitrary set, different from Un – the n-
fold cartesian product of U), we write PU(n) ≈ QU(n) if limn→∞ E[‖PU(n) − QU(n)‖1] → 0. Similarly,
for any two sequences of (non-random) p.m.f.’s (pU(n))n∈N and (qU(n))n∈N, we write pU(n) ≈ qU(n) if
limn→∞ ‖pU(n) − qU(n)‖1 → 0.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND STATEMENTS OF RESULTS
We study randomized function computation in the two user setting; see Figure 1. Problem is specified
by a pair (pXY , pZ|XY ), where X, Y, Z take values in finite alphabets X ,Y ,Z , respectively. One user
(Alice) has an input sequence Xn, other user (Bob) has an input sequence Y n, where (Xi, Yi)’s are
i.i.d. according to pXY , and Bob wants to compute an output sequence Zn, which should be distributed
according to pZn|XnY n(zn|xn, yn) := Πni=1pZ|XY (zi|xi, yi). We relax the correctness condition and allow
a small error in function computation: Bob may output Zˆn such that ‖pXnY nZˆn − pXnY nZn‖1 → 0 as
n → ∞. We allow only one sided communication, in which Alice sends a single message to Bob, and
then Bob produces an output. Both the users have access to private randomness only. A (n, 2nR)-code Cn
for computing (pXY , pZ|XY ) is defined as a pair of stochastic maps (pM |Xn , pZˆn|MY n), where alphabet of
M is {1, 2, . . . , 2nR} (here R is called the rate of the code Cn). We call pM |Xn the encoder and pZˆn|MY n
the decoder. Upon observing Xn, Alice maps Xn to an index M according to pM |Xn and sends M to
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Bob. Now Bob outputs Zˆn according to pZˆn|M,Y n . Note that the code Cn induces the following joint
distribution: pXnY nMZˆn = pXnY npM |XnpZˆn|MY n . We study this problem in two different settings – one
with privacy, and the other without privacy.
A. Randomized Function Computation With Privacy
We say that a sequence of codes (Cn)n∈N for computing (pXY , pZ|XY ) is secure if, (i) the L1-distance
between the induced pXnY nZˆn and the desired pXnY nZn goes to zero as block-length tends to infinity, and
(ii) the average amount of additional information Bob learns about Xn from the message M goes to zero
as block-length tends to infinity.
Definition 1. For a secure computation problem (pXY , pZ|XY ), we say that a rate R is achievable if there
exists a sequence of codes (Cn)n∈N with rate R, such that for every  > 0, there exists a large enough n,
such that
‖pXnY nZˆn − pXnY nZn‖1 ≤ , (1)
I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zˆn) ≤ n. (2)
We define the optimal rate RS as the infimum of all the achievable rates. If the set of achievable rates is
empty, we say that RS =∞; and (pXY , pZ|XY ) is said to be computable with asymptotic security, if RS
is finite.
If there exists a code with n = 1 such that (1) and (2) are satisfied with  = 0, then we say that
(pXY , pZ|XY ) is computable with perfect security, i.e., (pXY , pZ|XY ) is computable with perfect security,
if there exists p(u, x, y, z) = pXY Z(x, y, z)p(u|x, y, z) that satisfies the following Markov chains:
U −X − Y, (3)
Z − (U, Y )−X, (4)
U − (Y, Z)−X. (5)
Lemma 1. (pXY , pZ|XY ) is computable with asymptotic security if and only if it is computable with perfect
security.
Lemma 1 is proved in Appendix B. Our main result is the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose (pXY , pZ|XY ) is computable with asymptotic security. Then
RS = minpU|XY Z :
U−X−Y
Z−(U,Y )−X
U−(Y,Z)−X
I(Z;U |Y ),
where cardinality of U satisfies |U| ≤ |X | · |Y| · |Z|+ 2.
Theorem 1 is proved in Section III. If pXY has full support, then we obtain a more explicit expression
for the optimal rate. For this we first explicitly characterize securely computable (pXY , pZ|XY ), and give a
direct coding scheme along with a much simpler proof of its security without resorting to the achievability
proof of Theorem 1. Details are in Subsection III-A.
B. Randomized Function Computation Without Privacy
Definition 2. For a randomized function computation problem (pXY , pZ|XY ), we say that a rate R is
achievable if there exists a sequence of codes (Cn)n∈N with rate R, such that for every  > 0, there exists
a large enough n, such that
‖pXnY nZˆn − pXnY nZn‖1 ≤ . (6)
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We define the optimal rate RNS as the infimum of all the achievable rates.
Theorem 2. RNS = minpU|XY Z :
U−X−Y
Z−(U,Y )−X
I(X,Z;U |Y ), where cardinality of U satisfies |U| ≤ |X |· |Y|· |Z|+2.
Theorem 2 can be proved along the similar lines as Theorem 1; A proof is in Appendix F.
Remark 1. Theorem 2 can be seen as a generalization of a result of Orlitsky and Roche for determin-
istic function computation [14]: if pZ|XY is a deterministic function, i.e., pZ|XY = 1{Z=f(X,Y )}, where
f : X × Y → Z is the function being computed, then the rate expression in Theorem 2 reduces to
min
pU|XY Z
I(X;U |Y ), where minimization is taken over all pU |XY Z that satisfy U−X−Y and H(Z|U, Y ) = 0.
This rate expression was defined to be the conditional graph entropy of an appropriately defined graph
in [14]. We remark that in the case of randomized function computation, the rate expression in The-
orem 2 does not seem to reduce to graph entropy. However, if we additionally require privacy only
against Alice, i.e., I(M ;Y n, Zˆn|Xn) ≤ n holds, then the corresponding expression for the optimal rate
( min
pU|XY Z
I(X,Z;U |Y ), where minimization is taken over all pU |XY Z that satisfy U − X − (Y, Z) and
Z − (U, Y ) − X) reduces to conditional graph entropy of an appropriately defined graph (see [13] for
details).
III. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We first note that the cardinality bound of |U| ≤ |X | · |Y| · |Z|+2 follows from the Fenchel-Eggleston’s
strengthening of Carathéodory’s theorem [17, pg. 310]. We first prove the achievability and then prove
the converse.
Achievability: Our achievable scheme uses the OSRB (output statistics of random binning) framework
developed by Yassaee, Aref, and Gohari [15]. We sketch our proof here. A detailed proof can be found
in the Appendix C.
Fix a pU |XY Z that achieves the minimum in the expression for RS in Theorem 1. Define pUXY Z(u, x, y, z) :=
pXY Z(x, y, z) × pU |XY Z(u|x, y, z). Note that pUXY Z(u, x, y, z) = pXY (x, y) × pU |X(u|x) × pZ|UY (z|u, y)
such that U − (Y, Z) − X is a Markov chain. Now consider (Un, Xn, Y n, Zn), where (Ui, Xi, Yi, Zi)’s
are i.i.d. according to pUXY Z . To make notation less cluttered, in the following we write p(un, xn, yn, zn)
to mean Πni=1pUXY Z(ui, xi, yi, zi). We define two random mappings on Un as follows: to each sequence
un ∈ Un, assign two bins f ∈R [2nR′ ], m ∈R [2nRM ], independently and uniformly at random. Here m
serves as the message from Alice to Bob in the actual problem, and f serves as extra randomness. Since
we do not have any extra randomness in our model, later we will get rid of this by fixing an instance of
it. The random binning induces the following random p.m.f.
P (xn, yn, zn, un, f,m) = p(xn, yn, zn, un)P (f |un)P (m|un).
We use the Slepian-Wolf (SW) decoder P SW(uˆn|f,m, yn) to produce an estimate uˆn of un from (f,m, yn).
It turns out that if R′+RM > H(U |Y ), then the SW-decoder can reconstruct Un with low probability of
error using (F,M, Y n) and a knowledge of the binning (see Appendix C for details), i.e.,
P (xn, yn, un, f,m, uˆn) ≈ P (xn, yn, un, f,m)1{uˆn=un} (7)
This implies
P (xn, yn, un, zn, f,m, uˆn) ≈ P (xn, yn, un, zn, f,m)1{uˆn=un}
= p(xn, yn, zn, un)P (f |un)P (m|un)1{uˆn=un}. (8)
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Later when we remove F by conditioning on a particular instance f of it, P (xn, yn, zn|f) may not be
distributed as p(xn, yn, zn), which we need for our correctness condition. But if R′ < H(U |X, Y, Z), then
F becomes asymptotically independent of (Xn, Y n, Zn) (see Appendix C for details), i.e.,
P (xn, yn, zn, f) ≈ pU(f)p(xn, yn, zn), (9)
where pU(f) means that f takes values uniformly at random in [2nR′ ]. In order to obtain a p.m.f. that
corresponds to the actual coding scheme, we can expand P (xn, yn, un, f,m, uˆn, zn) in another way as
follows.
P (xn, yn, un, f,m, uˆn, zn) ≈ pU(f)p(xn, yn)
× P (un,m, uˆn|xn, yn, f)p(zn|uˆn, yn), (10)
where we define p(zn|uˆn, yn) := Πni=1pZ|UY (zi|uˆi, yi). Note that we only need R′ < H(U |X, Y ) (which
is implied by R′ < H(U |X, Y, Z)) to write P (xn, yn, f) ≈ pU(f)p(xn, yn) in (10). It follows from (8)-
(10) that, if R′ + RM > H(U |Y ) and R′ < H(U |X, Y, Z) hold, then there exists a fixed binning (with
corresponding p.m.f. p¯) such that
p¯(xn, yn, zn, f) ≈ pU(f)p(xn, yn, zn), (11)
pU(f)p(xn, yn)p¯(un,m, uˆn|xn, yn, f)p(zn|uˆn, yn)
≈ p(xn, yn, zn, un)p¯(f,m|un)1{uˆn=un}. (12)
For simplicity, define
q(xn, yn, zn, un, f,m, uˆn) := p(xn, yn, zn, un)p¯(f,m|un)
× 1{uˆn=un},
qˆ(xn, yn, zn, un, f,m, uˆn) := pU(f)p(xn, yn)
×p¯(un,m, uˆn|xn, yn, f)p(zn|uˆn, yn).
Note that qˆ corresponds to the actual coding scheme, except for the extra randomness f . It follows from
(11), (12), and the above two equations (by marginalizing (un, uˆn) away) that there exists an f with
p¯(f) > 0 (and pU(f) > 0) such that
p¯(xn, yn, zn|f) ≈ p(xn, yn, zn), (13)
qˆ(xn, yn, zn,m|f) ≈ q(xn, yn, zn,m|f). (14)
Now we show that qˆ(xn, yn, zn,m|f) satisfies correctness and privacy conditions.
Note that q(xn, yn, zn|f) = p¯(xn, yn, zn|f). This together with (13) and (14) implies correctness, i.e.,
qˆ(xn, yn, zn|f) ≈ p(xn, yn, zn). For the privacy condition, it can be shown using the Markov chain
U − (Y, Z) − X that I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zn)|q(xn,yn,zn,m|f) = 0. Now (14), together with the fact that mutual
information is a continuous function of the distribution, implies that I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zn)|qˆ(xn,yn,zn,m|f) → 0
as n→∞. Note that
qˆ(xn, yn, zn, un,m, uˆn|f) = p(xn, yn)p¯(un|xn, f)
×p¯(m|un)p¯SW(uˆn|f,m, yn)p(zn|uˆn, yn).
Identifying p¯(m|xn, f) = ∑un:m=m(un) p¯(un|xn, f) as the encoder, and (p¯SW(uˆn|f,m, yn), p(zn|uˆn, yn))
as the decoder results in a pair of encoder-decoder ensuring the security of the coding scheme. Now
it follows that, for every RM > I(X,Z;U |Y ), there exists R′ > 0 such that R′ < H(U |X, Y, Z) and
RM +R
′ > H(U |Y ) hold, which implies existence of a secure coding scheme by the above analysis with
rate RM . Using the Markov chain U − (Y, Z)−X we have RM > I(Z;U |Y ).
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Converse: Let (pXY , pZ|XY ) be securely computable with asymptotic security. For each  > 0, there is a
large enough n and a code Cn (with rate, say, R) that satisfies the following properties:
M −Xn − Y n, (15)
Zˆn − (M,Y n)−Xn, (16)
I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zˆn) ≤ n, (17)
‖pXnY nZˆn − pXnY nZn‖1] ≤ . (18)
We prove that the communication rate R required by Cn is lower-bounded by RS − δ, where δ → 0 as
→ 0.
nR ≥ H(M) ≥ H(M |Y n) ≥ I(M ;Xn, Zˆn|Y n)
= H(Xn, Zˆn|Y n)−H(Xn, Zˆn|M,Y n)
(a)≥ H(Xn, Zn|Y n)− n1 −H(Xn, Zˆn|M,Y n)
=
n∑
i=1
[H(Xi, Zi|Yi)−H(Xi, Zˆi|X i−1, Zˆi−1,M, Y n)− 1]
(b)≥
n∑
i=1
[H(Xi, Zˆi|Yi)− 2 −H(Xi, Zˆi|X i−1,M, Y n)− 1]
=
n∑
i=1
[I(Xi, Zˆi;Ui|Yi)− 1 − 2],
where Ui = (X i−1,M, Y i−1, Y ni+1)
= n
[ n∑
i=1
1
n
I(Xi, Zˆi;Ui|Yi, T = i)
]
− n1 − n2 (19)
= n[I(XT , ZˆT ;UT |YT , T )− 1 − 2]
= n[I(XT , ZˆT ;UT , T |YT )− I(XT , ZˆT ;T |YT )− 1 − 2]
(c)≥ n[I(XT , ZˆT ;UT , T |YT )− 3 − 1 − 2]. (20)
We used the following fact in (a)-(c): if V and V ′ are two random variables taking values in the same
alphabet V such that ‖pV −pV ′‖1 ≤  ≤ 1/4, then it follows from [17, Lemma 2.7] that |H(V )−H(V ′)| ≤
η log |V|, where η → 0 as → 0. Now (18) implies (a), i.e., H(Xn, Zˆn|Y n) ≥ H(Xn, Zn|Y n)−n1, where
1 → 0 as → 0. Note that (18) implies ‖pXiYiZˆi−pXiYiZi‖1 ≤ , for every i ∈ [n], which implies (b), i.e.,
H(Xi, Zˆi|Yi) ≥ H(Xi, Zi|Yi)− 2i, i ∈ [n], where 2i → 0 as → 0; take 2 = maxi∈[n]{2i}. The random
variable T in (19) is independent of (M,Xn, Y n, Zn, Zˆn) and is uniformly distributed in {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Inequality (c), i.e., I(XT , ZˆT ;T |YT ) ≤ 3, with 3 → 0 as  → 0, follows from ‖pXiYiZˆi − pXiYiZi‖1 ≤
, i ∈ [n], and that T is independent of (M,Xn, Y n, Zn, Zˆn), and is shown in Claim 4 in Appendix D. Let
U = (UT , T ). Similar to the above single-letterization by which we obtain (20), we can single-letterize
the conditions (15)-(18) (proof is in Appendix D). Let δ = 1 + 2 + 3. Now continuing from (20):
R ≥ min
pUZˆT |XT YT :
U−XT−YT
ZˆT−(U,YT )−XT
I(U ;XT |YT ,ZˆT )≤′
‖pXT YT ZˆT−pXT YT ZT ‖1≤
I(XT , ZˆT ;U |YT )− δ (21)
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= min
pUZˆT |XY :
U−X−Y
ZˆT−(U,Y )−X
I(U ;X|Y,ZˆT )≤′
‖pXY ZˆT−pXY Z‖1≤
I(X, ZˆT ;U |Y )− δ (22)
≥ min
pUZ|XY :
U−X−Y
Z−(U,Y )−X
U−(Y,Z)−X
I(X,Z;U |Y )− 4 − δ (23)
where δ′ = δ + 4 and δ′ → 0 as  → 0. In (22) we used pXTYT = pXY and pZT |XTYT = pZ|XY . In
(23) we used continuity of mutual information, continuity of L1-norm, and the fact that if (pXY , pZ|XY )
is computable with asymptotic security, it can also be computed with perfect security (details are at the
end of Appendix D). By using privacy condition U − (Y, Z) −X , the objective function in (22) can be
simplified as I(X,Z;U |Y ) = I(Z;U |Y ).
A. pXY with full support: characterization and a simpler rate-optimal code
If pXY has full support, then we find an explicit U that satisfies (3)-(5), which will simplify the
rate-expression in Theorem 1 (see Theorem 4). For this, we first characterize (pXY , pZ|XY ) that can be
computed with perfect security, where pXY has full support. None of the proofs in this section depends
on the specific distribution of pXY as long as it has full support. So the characterization remains the same
for all pXY that have full support.
For every y ∈ Y , define a set Z(y) = {z ∈ Z : ∃x ∈ X s.t. pZ|XY (z|x, y) > 0}. Essentially, the set
Z(y) discards all those elements of Z that never appear as an output when Bob’s input is y.
Definition 3. For y ∈ Y , define a relation ≡y on the set Z(y) as follows: for z, z′ ∈ Z(y), we say that
z ≡y z′ if there is a sequence z(1), z(2), . . . , z(l−1), z(l) such that z = z(1), z′ = z(l), and z(i) ∼y z(i+1), for
every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l − 1}.
It is easy to see that ≡y is an equivalence relation for every y ∈ Y , which partitions Z(y) into equivalent
classes. Consider a y ∈ Y , and let Z(y) = Z(y)1
⊎Z(y)2 ⊎ . . .⊎Z(y)k(y), where k(y) is the number of
equivalence classes in the partition generated by ≡y. For every equivalence class Z(y)i in this partition,
define a |X | × |Z(y)i | matrix A(y)i such that A(y)i (x, z) = pZ|XY (z|x, y) for every (x, z) ∈ X × Z(y)i . Note
that, for every i ∈ [k(y)], all the columns of A(y)i are multiples of each other. Since A(y)i is a rank-one
matrix, we can write it as A(y)i = ~α
(y)
i ~γ
(y)
i , where ~α
(y)
i is a column vector (whose entries are non-negative
and sum up to one, which makes it a unique probability vector) and ~γ(y)i is a row vector. Entries of ~α
(y)
i
and ~γ(y)i are indexed by x ∈ X and z ∈ Z(y)i , respectively. So A(y)i (x, z) = ~α(y)i (x)~γ(y)i (z). Note that if
~α
(y)
i = ~α
(y)
j , then i = j.
Suppose (pXY , pZ|XY ) is computable with perfect security, which implies that there exists p(u, x, y, z) =
pXY Z(x, y, z)p(u|x, y, z) that satisfies (3)-(5). Note that the random variable U corresponds to the message
that Alice sends to Bob. We define a set U (y)i to be the set of all those messages that Alice can send to
Bob, and when Bob, having y as his input outputs an element of Z(y)i , as follows:
U (y)i = {u ∈ U : p(u, z|y) > 0 for some z ∈ Z(y)i }. (24)
Note that for every y ∈ Y and i ∈ [k(y)], the probability vector ~α(y)i corresponds to the equivalence class
Z(y)i . The following claim is proved in Appendix E.
Claim 1. Consider any y, y′ ∈ Y and i ∈ [k(y)], j ∈ [k(y′)]. If ~α(y)i 6= ~α(y
′)
j , then U (y)i ∩ U (y
′)
j = φ.
With the help of Claim 1 we have (proof is in Appendix E) that for every y, y′ ∈ Y , the corresponding
collections of probability vectors {~α(y)i : i ∈ [k(y)]} and {~α(y
′)
j : j ∈ [k(y′)]} are equal.
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Claim 2. For all y, y′ ∈ Y , we have k(y) = k(y′) =: k, and {~α(y)1 , ~α(y)2 , . . . , ~α(y)k } = {~α(y
′)
1 , ~α
(y′)
2 , . . . , ~α
(y′)
k }.
For ease of notation, without loss of generality, we rearrange the indices, to have ~α(y
′)
j = ~α
(y)
i if and
only if i = j. Now it follows from Claim 1 and Claim 2 that the message set U and the alphabet Z(y),
for every y ∈ Y , can be partitioned into k parts as follows:
U = U1 unionmulti U2 unionmulti . . . unionmulti Uk,
Z(y) = Z(y)1 unionmulti Z(y)2 unionmulti . . . unionmulti Z(y)k ,
where Z(y)i = {z ∈ Z(y) : p(u, z|x, y) > 0 for some x ∈ X , u ∈ Ui}. Note that the same Ui is used
to define Z(y)i (and corresponds to ~α(y)i also) for every y ∈ Y . Now we can state the characterization
theorem, which is proved in Appendix E.
Theorem 3. Suppose pXY has full support. Then (pXY , pZ|XY ) is computable with perfect security if and
only if the following holds for every y, y′ ∈ Y:
1) {~α(y)1 , ~α(y)2 , . . . , ~α(y)k } = {~α(y
′)
1 , ~α
(y′)
2 , . . . , ~α
(y′)
k }.
2) For any i ∈ [k], ∑
z∈Z(y)i
pZ|XY (z|x, y) =
∑
z∈Z(y′)i
pZ|XY (z|x, y′) for every x ∈ X .
We introduce a new random variable W , which takes values in [k], and is jointly distributed with
(X, Y, Z) as follows: define pXYWZ(x, y, i, z) := 0, if pXY Z(x, y, z) = 0; otherwise, define
pXYWZ(x, y, i, z)
:= pXY (x, y)× pW |X(i|x)× pZ|WY (z|i, y)
:= pXY (x, y)×
( ∑
z∈Z(y)i
pZ|XY (z|x, y)
)
×
(
1{z∈Z(y)i }
× pZ|XY (z|x, y)∑
z∈Z(y)i
pZ|XY (z|x, y)
)
. (25)
Comments are in order: (i) We defined pW |X(i|x) to be
∑
z∈Z(y)i
pZ|XY (z|x, y) in (25) – this is a valid
definition because
∑
z∈Z(y)i
pZ|XY (z|x, y) is same for all y (see Theorem 3). (ii) We defined pZ|WY (z|i, y)
to be 1{z∈Z(y)i }
× pZ|XY (z|x,y)∑
z∈Z(y)
i
pZ|XY (z|x,y) in (25) – this is also a valid definition because the matrix A
(y)
i defined
earlier is a rank-one matrix, and therefore, pZ|XY (z|x˜,y)∑
z∈Z(y)
i
pZ|XY (z|x˜,y) is same for all x˜’s for which pZ|XY (z|x˜, y) >
0. It follows from (25) that pXYWZ(x, y, i, z) = 1{z∈Z(y)i }
× pXY Z(x, y, z). Note that W is a deterministic
function of both U as well as of (Y, Z). Now we are ready to state the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 4. Suppose (pXY , pZ|XY ) is computable with asymptotic security, where pXY has full support.
Then
RS = H(W |Y ),
where H(W |Y ) is evaluated with pWY , obtained from (25).
Proof. Although the general achievability of Theorem 1 is applicable here, we give a more direct coding
scheme with a simpler argument of its correctness and privacy. Alice passes Xn through the virtual DMC
pW |X and obtains an i.i.d. sequence W n, where pW |X is obtained from (25). Note that if Bob gets access
to this W n sequence exactly, then perfect correctness can be achieved – Bob outputs an i.i.d. sequence
Zn by passing (W n, Y n) through the virtual DMC pZ|WY , where pZ|WY is obtained from (25). It turns
out that conveying W n to Bob also maintains privacy against Bob. Now Alice can use the Slepian-Wolf
coding scheme to convey W n to Bob at a rate H(W |Y ). We show in Appendix E that this scheme is
asymptotically secure. For the converse, note that W is a function of both U as well as of (Y, Z), and
using this we can simplify the objective function in (23): I(Z;U |Y ) = I(Z,W ;U,W |Y ) ≥ H(W |Y ).
8
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Deepesh Data would like to thank Gowtham Raghunath Kurri for explaining to him the OSRB frame-
work. This work was done in part while Deepesh Data was visiting IDC Herzliya, Israel, when he was
supported by ERC under the EU’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013) ERC Grant Agreement
n. 307952. Deepesh Data’s research was supported in part by a Microsoft Research India Ph.D. Fellowship.
Vinod Prabhakaran’s research was supported in part by a Ramanujan Fellowship from the Department
of Science and Technology, Government of India and by Information Technology Research Academy
(ITRA), Government of India under ITRA Mobile grant ITRA/15(64)/Mobile/USEAADWN/01.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Shamir, R. L. Rivest, and L. M. Adleman, “Mental poker,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Tech. Rep., 1979.
[2] M. O. Rabin, “How to exchange secrets by oblivious transfer,” Harvard University, Tech. Rep., 1981.
[3] A. C.-C. Yao, “Protocols for secure computations,” in FOCS, vol. 82, 1982, pp. 160–164.
[4] A. C. Yao, “How to generate and exchange secrets (extended abstract),” in FOCS, 1986, pp. 162–167.
[5] E. Kushilevitz, “Privacy and communication complexity,” in FOCS, 1989, pp. 416–421.
[6] D. Beaver, “Perfect privacy for two-party protocols,” in Distributed Computing And Cryptography, Proceedings of a DIMACS Workshop,
Princeton, New Jersey, USA, October 4-6, 1989, 1989, pp. 65–78.
[7] H. K. Maji, M. Prabhakaran, and M. Rosulek, “Complexity of multi-party computation problems: The case of 2-party symmetric secure
function evaluation,” in TCC 2009, 2009, pp. 256–273.
[8] P. Narayan, H. Tyagi, and S. Watanabe, “Common randomness for secure computing,” in IEEE ISIT 2015, 2015, pp. 949–953.
[9] A. D. Wyner, “The common information of two dependent random variables,” IEEE Trans. Information Theory, vol. 21, no. 2, pp.
163–179, 1975.
[10] Y. Wang and P. Ishwar, “On unconditionally secure multi-party sampling from scratch,” in IEEE ISIT, 2011, pp. 1782–1786.
[11] H. Tyagi, P. Narayan, and P. Gupta, “When is a function securely computable?” IEEE Trans. on Inform. Theory, vol. 57, no. 10, pp.
6337–6350, 2011.
[12] J. Kilian, “More general completeness theorems for secure two-party computation,” in STOC, 2000, pp. 316–324.
[13] D. Data, “Secure computation of randomized functions,” in IEEE ISIT, 2016, pp. 3053–3057, full version at
http://arxiv.org/abs/1601.06562.
[14] A. Orlitsky and J. R. Roche, “Coding for computing,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 903–917, 2001.
[15] M. H. Yassaee, M. R. Aref, and A. Gohari, “Achievability proof via output statistics of random binning,” IEEE Trans. Information
Theory, vol. 60, no. 11, pp. 6760–6786, 2014.
[16] P. Cuff, “Distributed channel synthesis,” IEEE Trans. Information Theory, vol. 59, no. 11, pp. 7071–7096, 2013.
[17] I. Csiszár and J. Körner, Information Theory: Coding Theorems for Discrete Memoryless Systems, 2nd ed. Cambridge University
Press, 2011.
[18] A. E. Gamal and Y.-H. Kim, Network Information Theory. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
APPENDIX A
PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
We abbreviate discrete memoryless channel by DMC and independent and identically distributed by
i.i.d. We write pU to denote the uniform distribution over the corresponding alphabet. We write capital
letters P,Q, etc., to denote random p.m.f.’s (more on this in Subsection A-B), and small letters p, q, etc.,
to denote non-random p.m.f.’s The total variation distance between two (non-random) p.m.f.’s pU and qU
on the same alphabet U is defined by ‖pU − qU‖1 := 12
∑
u∈U |pU(u)− qU(u)|. Note that ‖pU − qU‖1 ≤ 1.
Definition 4. For any two random p.m.f.’s PU and QU on U , we write PU ≈ QU if E[‖PU −QU‖1] < .
Similarly, for any two (non-random) p.m.f.’s pU and qU on U , we write pU ≈ qU if ‖pU − qU‖1 < .
Definition 5. For any two sequences of random p.m.f.’s (PU(n))n∈N and (QU(n))n∈N (where for every n ∈ N,
U (n) takes values in U (n) which is an arbitrary set, different from Un – the n-fold cartesian product of
U), we write PU(n) ≈ QU(n) if limn→∞ E[‖PU(n) − QU(n)‖1] → 0. Similarly, for any two sequences of
(non-random) p.m.f.’s (pU(n))n∈N and (qU(n))n∈N, we write pU(n) ≈ qU(n) if limn→∞ ‖pU(n) − qU(n)‖1 → 0.
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B. Output Statistics of Random Binning
Some of our achievability proofs use the OSRB (output statistics of random binning) framework
developed by Yassaee, Aref, and Gohari [15] and their results. We simplify the setting and statements of
these results for our purpose. Let (U, V ) be a discrete memoryless correlated source distributed according
to a p.m.f. pUV , where U and V take values in finite alphabets U and V , respectively. A random binning B
consists of a set of two random mappings Bi : Un → [2nRi ], i ∈ {1, 2}, in which Bi maps each sequence
un ∈ Un uniformly and independently to an element in [2nRi ]. In other words, the random binning Bi is a
random partition of the set Un into 2nRi bins. In the following we write p(un, vn) to denote Πni=1pUV (ui, vi).
A random binning induces the following random p.m.f. on the set Un × Vn × [2nR1 ]× [2nR2 ]:
P (un, vn, b1, b2) = p(u
n, vn)× Π2i=11{Bi(un)=bi},
where capital P is used to indicate the p.m.f. induced on (un, vn, b1, b2) is random. For i ∈ {1, 2}, the
following theorem finds constraints on the rate Ri, such that V n becomes asymptotically independent of
the bin Bi(Un) in expectation, where expectation is taken over the random binning Bi.
Theorem 5. [15, Theorem 1] For i ∈ {1, 2}, if Ri < H(U |V ), then as n goes to infinity, we have
EBi [‖P (vn, bi)− p(vn)× pU(bi)‖1]→ 0,
where Bi is the set of all random mappings Bi : Un → [2nRi ].
Now we write the achievability statement of Slepian-Wolf theorem in a different equivalent from. Note
that achievability proof of the Slepian-Wolf theorem [18, Section 10.3.2] gives (i) a constraint on the rate
R1 +R2 that allows reconstruction of Un from the bin indices B1(Un),B2(Un) and V n, and (ii) a decoder
(with respect to any fixed binning), which outputs uˆn in the presence of bin (b1, b2) and the sequence vn,
such that the probability of reconstruction error goes to zero as n tends to infinity. Here we denote the
decoder by the random conditional p.m.f. P SW(uˆn|vn, b1, b2). Since the decoder is a function, this random
p.m.f. P SW(uˆn|vn, b1, b2) takes only two values 0 and 1: for a Slepian-Wolf decoder that uses a jointly
typical decoder, P SW(uˆn|vn, b1, b2) = 1 if uˆn is the unique jointly typical sequence with vn in the bin
(b1, b2). If there does not exists the unique sequence uˆn in the bin (b1, b2) that is jointly typical with vn,
then uˆn is taken to be a fixed arbitrary sequence.
Lemma 2. [15, Lemma 1] If R1 +R2 > H(U |V ), then as n goes to infinity, we have
EB[‖P (un, vn, uˆn)− p(un, vn)× 1{uˆn=un}‖1]→ 0,
where B is the set of all random mappings Bi : Un → [2nRi ], i ∈ {1, 2}.
APPENDIX B
DETAILS OMITTED FROM SECTION II
Proof of Lemma 1. This can be proved along the lines of the proof of Theorem 3 in [13].
APPENDIX C
ACHIEVABILITY PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Achievability: Our achievable scheme uses the OSRB (output statistics of random binning) framework
developed by Yassaee, Aref, and Gohari [15]. According to the OSRB framework, we divide our achiev-
ability proof in three parts: in part (1) we define two protocols, protocol A and protocol B. Each of these
protocols will induce a p.m.f. on random variables defined during the protocol (see Figure 2). Protocol
A corresponds to the source coding side of the problem (see Figure 2a) and does not lead to a coding
algorithm; protocol B almost gives a coding scheme, except for the fact that it is assisted with shared
randomness (see Figure 2b)), which does not exist in the problem that we are trying to solve. In part
(2) our goal is to find conditions that will make these two distributions almost identical. Once we find
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such conditions (which will make protocol A and protocol B almost identical) we can investigate the
correctness and privacy properties, that we want protocol B to satisfy, in protocol A. Notice that protocol
B gives a coding scheme only if there is no shared randomness. We get rid of this in part (3) by finding
an instance of a shared randomness in protocol B, conditioned on which both correctness and privacy
conditions are still preserved. Details are given below.
Xn pU |X Un B
B
M D U
n
pZ|UY Zn
Y n Y n
pY |X
F
1
(a) Source coding side of the problem
Xn P (un|xn, f) Un B M D Uˆ
n
pZ|UY Zn
Y n Y n
pY |X
F
1
(b) Coding for the actual problem assisted with the extra shared
randomness
Fig. 2 (Figure 2a.) The source coding side of the problem (Protocol A). Given an i.i.d. source (Xn, Y n), we pass the Xn sequence through
a virtual DMC pU|X to get an i.i.d. sequence Un, and then we pass (Un, Y n) sequence through another virtual DMC pZ|UY to get an i.i.d.
sequence Zn. Here, (Xn, Y n, Zn) have the desired i.i.d. distribution according to pXnY nZn(xn, yn, zn) = Πni=1pXY Z(xi, yi, zi). Since
the decoder needs access to the Un sequence to produce Zn, we have to describe the Un sequence to decoder. We do this by assigning two
random and independent bins M and F to Un sequences, where M will serve as the message from Alice to Bob in the actual problem,
and F will serve as extra randomness. Bob uses the Slepian-Wolf decoder for estimating Un from (M,F, Y n). If the SW constraint in (33)
is satisfied, Bob will be able to estimate the Un sequence using the SW decoder with low probability of error. Note that the Un sequence
that we are feeding into the DMC pZ|UY is not equal to the output of the SW decoder, but it is the i.i.d. Un sequence that we obtained
earlier by passing Xn through the DMC pU|X . (Figure 2b.) Coding for the actual problem assisted with extra shared randomness (Protocol
B). Given an i.i.d. source (Xn, Y n), we pass Xn and the extra shared randomness F through the reverse encoder P (un|xn, f) (which is
obtained from protocol A) to get a Un sequence (Ui’s may not be i.i.d.). Alice uses the p.m.f. obtained from protocol A to map this Un
sequence to a message M and sends it to Bob. Bob uses the SW decoder of protocol A to decode Uˆn from (M,F, Y n), and produces a Zn
sequence (where Zi’s may not be i.i.d.) by passing (Uˆn, Y n) through pZ|UY . Note that in protocol B, F and (Xn, Y n) are independent,
whereas in protocol A, they may not be. To make the two p.m.f.’s (induced by protocol A and protocol B) almost identical, we need to have
the asymptotic independence between F and (Xn, Y n) in protocol A, which is ensured by (29). Finally, since we do not have any shared
randomness in the problem that we trying to solve, we must eliminate F by conditioning on an instance of shared randomness without
disturbing the desired joint distribution of (Xn, Y n, Zn). This is ensured by (31), which makes F and (Xn, Y n, Zn) almost independent
in protocol A.
Part (1) of the proof: We will define two protocols here, one of which is related to the source coding side
of the problem (see Figure 2a) and the other one is related to the actual protocol (with shared randomness)
(see Figure 2b).
Protocol A: Fix a pU |XY Z that achieves the minimum in the expression for RS in Theorem 1. De-
fine pUXY Z(u, x, y, z) := pXY Z(x, y, z) × pU |XY Z(u|x, y, z). Note that pUXY Z(u, x, y, z) = pXY (x, y) ×
pU |X(u|x)× pZ|UY (z|u, y) such that U − (Y, Z)−X is a Markov chain. Now consider (Un, Xn, Y n, Zn),
where (Ui, Xi, Yi, Zi)’s are i.i.d. according to pUXY Z . To make the notation less cluttered, in the following
we write p(un, xn, yn, zn) to mean Πni=1pUXY Z(ui, xi, yi, zi).
1) Map each sequence un ∈ Un into two bins f ∈R [2nR′ ] and m ∈R [2nRM ], independently and
uniformly at random.
2) We will use Slepian-Wolf decoder to estimate un from (f,m, yn).
In part (2) and part (3) of the proof, we will impose constraints on the rates R′ and RM that will imply
that RM ≥ I(Z;U |Y ). Now we will see the joint distribution induced by the protocol A as depicted in
Figure 2a. We denote the random p.m.f. (p.m.f. is random because binning is random) induced by the
protocol A by P as follows:
P (xn, yn,un, zn, f,m, uˆn)
= p(xn, yn, un)× p(zn|un, yn)× P (f |un)× P (m|un)× P SW(uˆn|f,m, yn) (26)
= p(xn, yn, un)× P (f |un)× P (m|un)× P SW(uˆn|f,m, yn)× p(zn|un, yn)
= P (xn, yn, un, f)× P (m|un)× P SW(uˆn|f,m, yn)× p(zn|un, yn)
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= P (xn, yn, f)× P (un|xn, yn, f)× P (m|un)× P SW(uˆn|f,m, yn)× p(zn|un, yn)
= P (xn, yn, f)× P (un|xn, f)× P (m|un)× P SW(uˆn|f,m, yn)× p(zn|un, yn) (27)
In (26) we used the fact that p(u, x, y, z) satisfies Z − (Y, U) − X . In (27) we used the Markov chain
Un − (Xn, F )− Y n (which is shown below) to write P (un|xn, yn, f) = P (un|xn, f).
I(Un;Y n|Xn, F ) ≤ I(Un, F ;Y n|Xn)
= I(Un;Y n|Xn) + I(F ;Y n|Un, Xn)
≤ I(Un;Y n|Xn) + I(F ;Xn, Y n|Un)
= 0
where in the last equality we used I(Un;Y n|Xn) = 0 (which follows because I(Un;Y n|Xn) = nI(U ;Y |X),
and that U − X − Y is a Markov chain) and I(F ;Xn, Y n|Un) = 0 (which follows from the fact that
conditioned on Un the bin index F is independent of (Xn, Y n)).
Protocol B: In this protocol we assume that Alice and Bob have access to shared randomness, denoted
by F , which is uniformly distributed in [2nR′ ]. Note that F is independent of (Xn, Y n).
1) Alice samples a sequence un according to P (un|xn, f) and then the bin index m according to
P (m|un) (where these distributions are defined in protocol A) and sends m to Bob.
2) Bob, having access to f,m, yn and a knowledge of the binning, uses the Slepian-Wolf decoder
P SW(uˆn|f,m, yn) (from protocol A) to obtain uˆn – an estimate of un – and outputs zn according to
p(zn|uˆn, yn) (which is equal to Πni=1pZ|UY (zi|uˆi, yi)).
Let Pˆ (xn, yn, un, zn, f,m, uˆn) denote the random p.m.f. induced by the protocol B, which is described as
follows:
Pˆ (xn, yn, un, zn, f,m, uˆn) = p(xn, yn)× pU(f)× P (un|xn, f)× P (m|un)
× P SW(uˆn|f,m, yn)× p(zn|uˆn, yn) (28)
Part (2) of the proof: Here we find some constraints on the rates RM , R′ that will make the p.m.f.’s P
(from protocol A) and Pˆ (from protocol B) close in total variation distance. It suffices to find constraints
that will make P (xn, yn, f) close to p(xn, yn) × pU(f) and the Slepian-Wolf decoder to reliably decode
the sequence Un.
1) Note that f is a bin index of the sequence un. So, it follows from Theorem 5 (by putting V = (X, Y ))
that if
R′ < H(U |X, Y ), (29)
then P (xn, yn, f) ≈ pU(f)× p(xn, yn) = Pˆ (xn, yn, f). This implies (by marginalizing zn away from
(27) and (28)) that
P (xn, yn, un, f,m, uˆn) ≈ Pˆ (xn, yn, un, f,m, uˆn). (30)
Note that asymptotic independence of F and (Xn, Y n) is enough to establish (30). However, we
will need asymptotic independence of F and (Xn, Y n, Zn) in P (in part (3) of the proof) to ensure
correctness of our protocol when we remove the shared randomness between Alice and Bob in
protocol B (after fixing a binning in protocol A). It follows from Theorem 5 (by putting V =
(X, Y, Z)) that if
R′ < H(U |X, Y, Z), (31)
then
P (xn, yn, zn, f) ≈ pU(f)× p(xn, yn, zn). (32)
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Note that (31) implies (29).
2) It follows from Lemma 2 (by putting V = Y ) that if
R′ +RM > H(U |Y ) (33)
then the Slepian-Wolf decoder of protocol A will decode the sequence Un with low probability of
error, i.e.,
P (xn, yn, un, f,m, uˆn) ≈ P (xn, yn, un, f,m)× 1{uˆn=un}. (34)
(30) and (34) imply
Pˆ (xn, yn, un, f,m, uˆn) ≈ P (xn, yn, un, f,m)× 1{uˆn=un}. (35)
Now, using (34) and (35) we can show that the p.m.f.’s P and Pˆ are close in total variation distance as
follows:
Pˆ (xn, yn, un, zn, f,m, uˆn) = Pˆ (xn, yn, un, f,m, uˆn)× p(zn|uˆn, yn)
≈ P (xn, yn, un, f,m)× 1{uˆn=un} × p(zn|uˆn, yn) (36)
= P (xn, yn, un, f,m)× 1{uˆn=un} × p(zn|un, yn)
≈ P (xn, yn, un, f,m, uˆn)× p(zn|un, yn) (37)
= P (xn, yn, un, zn, f,m, uˆn) (38)
(36) and (37) follow from (35) and (34), respectively. Marginalizing un, uˆn away from (38) gives
Pˆ (xn, yn, zn, f,m) ≈ P (xn, yn, zn, f,m). (39)
Part (3) of the proof: Note that there is no shared randomness between Alice and Bob in the problem
that we are trying to solve. Now we find an instance f of the shared randomness, conditioned on which
Pˆ (xn, yn, un, zn,m|f) satisfies correctness and privacy. It follows from (32) and (39) that
lim
n→∞
EB[‖P (xn, yn, zn, f)− pU(f)× p(xn, yn, zn)‖1 + ‖Pˆ (xn, yn, zn, f,m)− P (xn, yn, zn, f,m)‖1] = 0,
where expectation is taken over random binning. This implies that there exists a fixed binning (with the
corresponding p.m.f. p¯) such that if we replace P with p¯ in (28) and denote the resulting p.m.f. with pˆ,
we have
p¯(xn, yn, zn, f) ≈ pU(f)× p(xn, yn, zn), (40)
pˆ(xn, yn, zn, f,m) ≈ p¯(xn, yn, zn, f,m). (41)
(40) and (41) imply (proved in Claim 3 at the end of part (3)) that there exists an f such that p¯(f) > 0
and
p¯(xn, yn, zn|f) ≈ p(xn, yn, zn), (42)
pˆ(xn, yn, zn,m|f) ≈ p¯(xn, yn, zn,m|f). (43)
Note that pˆ(f) = pU(f) > 0 for every f , which implies that, for all f , if p¯(f) > 0, then pˆ(f) > 0. So,
all the terms in (42) and (43) are well-defined. Now we show that pˆ(xn, yn, zn,m|f) from (43) satisfies
correctness and privacy conditions.
Correctness: Marginalizing m away from (43) and using (42) imply the correctness condition, i.e.,
pˆ(xn, yn, zn|f) ≈ p(xn, yn, zn).
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Privacy: In order to show privacy, i.e., I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zn)|pˆ(xn,yn,zn,m|f) → 0, as n→∞, we first show
p¯(xn, yn, zn, f,m) = p(xn, yn, zn)× p¯(f,m|yn, zn):
p¯(xn, yn, zn, f,m) =
∑
un
p¯(xn, yn, zn, un, f,m)
=
∑
un
p(xn, yn, zn)× p(un|xn, yn, zn)× p¯(f,m|un)
(a)
=
∑
un
p(xn, yn, zn)× p(un|yn, zn)× p¯(f,m|un)
=
∑
un
p(xn, yn, zn)× p¯(un, f,m|yn, zn)
= p(xn, yn, zn)× p¯(f,m|yn, zn)
where (a) follows from the fact that p(un, xn, yn, zn) = Πni=1p(ui, xi, yi, zi) and that p(u, x, y, z) satisfies
the Markov chain U − (Y, Z)−X . So we have
I(F,M ;Xn|Y n, Zn)|p¯(xn,yn,zn,f,m) = 0
=⇒ I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zn, F )|p¯(xn,yn,zn,f,m) = 0
=⇒ I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zn, F = f)|p¯(xn,yn,zn,f,m) = 0, ∀f, s.t. p¯(f) > 0
=⇒ I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zn)|p¯(xn,yn,zn,m|f) = 0, ∀f, s.t. p¯(f) > 0
In particular, I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zn)|p¯(xn,yn,zn,m|f) = 0 with the specific f in (43). We have pˆ(xn, yn, zn,m|f) ≈
p¯(xn, yn, zn,m|f) and I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zn)|p¯(xn,yn,zn,m|f) = 0. Now, since mutual information is a continuous
function of the distribution, we have
I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zn)|pˆ(xn,yn,zn,m|f) → 0, as n→∞.
It follows from (31) and (33) that, for every RM > I(X,Z;U |Y ) there exists R′ > 0 such that
R′ < H(U |X, Y, Z) and RM + R′ > H(U |Y ) hold, which implies existence of a secure coding scheme
by the above analysis with rate RM . Since U − (Y, Z)−X is a Markov chain, we have RM > I(Z;U |Y ).
We have to give a pair of encoder and decoder that results in a distribution that satisfies correctness and
privacy conditions. The encoder is specified by p¯(m|xn, f) = ∑un:m=m(un) p¯(un|xn, f), and the decoder
is specified by (p¯SW(uˆn|f,m, yn), p(zn|uˆn, yn)).
Claim 3. Let n, δn → 0 be such that
p¯(xn, yn, zn, f)
n≈ pU(f)× p(xn, yn, zn), (44)
pˆ(xn, yn, zn, f,m)
δn≈ p¯(xn, yn, zn, f,m) (45)
hold. Then there exists an f such that p¯(f) > 0 and
p¯(xn, yn, zn|f) 3n+δn≈ p(xn, yn, zn),
pˆ(xn, yn, zn,m|f) 3n+δn≈ p¯(xn, yn, zn,m|f).
Proof. Note that (44) implies p¯(f)
n≈ pU(f) and (28) implies pˆ(f) = pU(f). Putting these back in (44)
and (45) gives:
p¯(f)× p¯(xn, yn, zn|f) 2n≈ p¯(f)× p(xn, yn, zn), (46)
p¯(f)× pˆ(xn, yn, zn,m|f) n+δn≈ p¯(f)× p¯(xn, yn, zn,m|f). (47)
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(46) and (47) imply ∑
f
p¯(f)× ‖p¯(xn, yn, zn|f)− p(xn, yn, zn)‖1 ≤ 2n, (48)∑
f
p¯(f)× ‖pˆ(xn, yn, zn,m|f)− p¯(xn, yn, zn,m|f)‖1 ≤ n + δn. (49)
(48) and (49) imply∑
f
p¯(f)×
[
‖p¯(xn, yn, zn|f)− p(xn, yn, zn)‖1+‖pˆ(xn, yn, zn,m|f)− p¯(xn, yn, zn,m|f)‖1
]
≤ 3n + δn. (50)
Now (50) implies that there exists an f such that p¯(f) > 0 and
[‖p¯(xn, yn, zn|f)− p(xn, yn, zn)‖1+‖pˆ(xn, yn, zn,m|f)− p¯(xn, yn, zn,m|f)‖1 ≤ 3n + δn. (51)
This means that each term on the left hand side is upper-bounded by 3n+δn, which implies our claim.
APPENDIX D
DETAILS OMITTED FROM THE CONVERSE OF THEOREM 1 IN SECTION III
First we show that I(XT , ZˆT ;T |YT ) ≤ 3, where 3 → 0 as  → 0, which implies the inequality in
(20).
Claim 4. I(XT , ZˆT ;T |YT ) ≤ 3, where 3 → 0 as → 0.
Proof.
I(XT , ZˆT ;T |YT ) = H(XT , ZˆT |YT )−H(XT , ZˆT |YT , T )
(d)≤ H(XT , ZT |YT ) + δ1 −H(XT , ZˆT |YT , T )
= H(XT , ZT |YT ) + δ1 −
n∑
i=1
1
n
H(Xi, Zˆi|Yi, T = i)
(e)
= H(XT , ZT |YT ) + δ1 −
n∑
i=1
1
n
H(Xi, Zˆi|Yi)
(f)≤ H(XT , ZT |YT ) + δ1 −
n∑
i=1
1
n
[H(Xi, Zi|Yi)− δ2]
(g)
= H(XT , ZT |YT ) + δ1 + δ2 −
n∑
i=1
1
n
H(Xi, Zi|Yi, T = i)
= H(XT , ZT |YT ) + δ1 + δ2 −H(XT , ZT |YT , T )
(h)
= H(X,Z|Y ) + δ1 + δ2 −H(X,Z|Y )
= 3, where 3 = δ1 + δ2.
We used the following fact in (d) and (f): if V and V ′ are two random variables taking values in the
same alphabet V such that ‖pV − pV ′‖1 ≤  ≤ 1/4, then it follows from [17, Lemma 2.7] that |H(V )−
H(V ′)| ≤ η log |V|, where η → 0 as  → 0. Now ‖pXTYT ZˆT − pXTYTZT ‖1 ≤  (see (52)) implies (d),
i.e., H(XT , ZˆT |YT ) ≤ H(XT , ZT |YT ) + δ1, where δ1 → 0 as  → 0. Similarly, ‖pXiYiZˆi − pXiYiZi‖1 ≤
, i ∈ [n] (see (53)) implies (f), i.e., H(Xi, Zˆi|Yi) ≥ H(Xi, Zi|Yi) − δ2i, where δ2i → 0 as  → 0; take
δ2 = maxi∈[n]{δ2i}. In (e) and (g) we used the fact that T is independent of (M,Xn, Y n, Zn, Zˆn). Since
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3 = δ1 + δ2, we have 3 → 0 as  → 0. In (h) we used the fact that pXTYTZT = pXY Z and that T is
independent of (X, Y, Z).
Now we single-letterize conditions (15)-(18). While doing this we will introduce a time-sharing random
variable T that is independent of (M,Xn, Y n, Zn, Zˆn) and uniformly distributed in {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Single-letterizing (15):
0 = I(M ;Y n|Xn)
= H(Y n|Xn)−H(Y n|Xn,M)
=
n∑
i=1
[H(Yi|Xi)−H(Yi|Xn,M, Y i−1)]
≥
n∑
i=1
[H(Yi|Xi)−H(Yi|Xi, X i−1,M, Y i−1)]
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
[H(Yi|Xi)−H(Yi|Xi, X i−1,M, Y i−1, Y ni+1)]
=
n∑
i=1
[H(Yi|Xi)−H(Yi|Xi, Ui)], where Ui = (X i−1,M, Y i−1, Y ni+1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Yi|Xi)
(b)
= n
n∑
i=1
1
n
I(Ui;Yi|Xi, T = i)
= n · I(UT ;YT |XT , T )
= n · I(UT , T︸ ︷︷ ︸
= U
;YT |XT )
= n · I(U ;YT |XT )
In (a) we used the Markov chain Yi − (M,X i, Y i−1)− Y ni+1. As stated earlier, the random variable T in
(b) is independent of (M,Xn, Y n, Zn, Zˆn) and uniformly distributed in {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Single-letterizing (16):
0 = I(Zˆn;Xn|M,Y n)
= H(Xn|M,Y n)−H(Xn|M,Y n, Zˆn)
=
n∑
i=1
[H(Xi|X i−1,M, Y n)−H(Xi|X i−1,M, Y n, Zˆn)]
≥
n∑
i=1
[H(Xi|X i−1,M, Y n)−H(Xi|X i−1,M, Y n, Zˆi)]
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Zˆi|X i−1,M, Y i−1, Y ni+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
= Ui
, Yi)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Zˆi|Ui, Yi)
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= n · I(XT ; ZˆT |U, YT )
Last equality follows from the similar reasoning as before.
Single-letterizing (17):
n ≥ I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zˆn)
= H(Xn|Y n, Zˆn)−H(Xn|M,Y n, Zˆn)
(a)≥ H(Xn|Y n, Zn)− n′ −H(Xn|M,Y n, Zˆn)
=
n∑
i=1
[H(Xi|Yi, Zi)−H(Xi|X i−1,M, Y n, Zˆn)]− n′
≥
n∑
i=1
[H(Xi|Yi, Zi)−H(Xi|X i−1,M, Y n, Zˆi)]− n′
(b)≥
n∑
i=1
[H(Xi|Yi, Zˆi)− ′′ −H(Xi|X i−1,M, Y i−1, Y ni+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
= Ui
, Yi, Zˆi)]− n′
=
n∑
i=1
[I(Ui;Xi|Yi, Zˆi)− ′ − ′′]
=
n∑
i=1
[I(Ui;Xi|Yi, Zˆi)− ′ − ′′]
(c)
= n[I(UT ;XT |YT , ZˆT , T )− ′ − ′′]
= n[I(UT , T ;XT |YT , ZˆT )− I(T ;XT |YT , ZˆT )− ′ − ′′]
(d)≥ n[I(UT , T ;XT |YT , ZˆT )− ′′′ − ′ − ′′].
We used the following fact in (a),(b), and (d): if V and V ′ are two random variables taking values in
the same alphabet V such that ‖pV − pV ′‖1 ≤  ≤ 1/4, then it follows from [17, Lemma 2.7] that
|H(V ) − H(V ′)| ≤ η log |V|, where η → 0 as  → 0. Now (18) implies (a), i.e., H(Xn|Y n, Zˆn) ≥
H(Xn|Y n, Zn)− n′, where ′ → 0 as → 0. Note that (18) implies ‖pXiYiZˆi − pXiYiZi‖1 ≤ , for every
i ∈ [n], which implies (b), i.e., H(Xi|Yi, Zˆi) ≥ H(Xi|Yi, Zi) − ′′i , i ∈ [n], where ′′i → 0 as  → 0;
take ′′ = maxi∈[n]{′′i }. (c) follows from the similar reasoning as before, where the random variable T
is independent of (M,Xn, Y n, Zn, Zˆn) and is uniformly distributed in {1, 2, . . . , n}. Inequality (d), i.e.,
I(T ;XT |YT , ZˆT ) ≤ ′′′, with ′′′ → 0 as → 0, can be shown along the lines of the proof of Claim 4. So
we get I(U ;XT |YT , ZˆT ) ≤ δ′, where δ′ = + ′ + ′′ + ′′′ and δ′ → 0 as → 0.
Single-letterizing (18): Below we prove that ‖pXnY nZˆn−pXnY nZn‖1 ≤  =⇒ ‖pXiYiZˆi−pXiYiZi‖1 ≤ ,
for every i ∈ [n]. This implies that
‖pXTYT ZˆT − pXTYTZT ‖1 ≤  for a random T. (52)
Consider an arbitrary i ∈ [n].
‖pXiYiZˆi − pXiYiZi‖1
=
∑
x,y,z
|pXiYiZˆi(x, y, z)− pXiYiZi(x, y, z)|
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=
∑
x,y,z
|
∑
xn,yn,zn:
xi=x,
yi=y,
zi=z
pXnY nZˆn(x
n, yn, zn)− pXnY nZn(xn, yn, zn)|
(a)≤
∑
xn,yn,zn
|pXnY nZˆn(xn, yn, zn)− pXnY nZn(xn, yn, zn)|
= ‖pXnY nZˆn − pXnY nZn‖1
≤ , (53)
where (a) follows from the triangle inequality.
Explanation of (23). For a fixed (pXY , pZ|XY ), let us define the following function:
R(pXY , pZ|XY ) := minpUZˆ|XY :
I(U ;Y |X)≤
I(U ;X|Y,Zˆ)≤
I(Zˆ;X|U,Y )≤
‖pXY Zˆ−pXY Z‖1≤
I(X, Zˆ;U |Y ).
Note that the expression in (22) can be lower-bounded by R(pXY , pZ|XY )−δ, because we relax two of the
Markov chains in the definition of R. To prove the inequality in (23), it suffices to show that the function
R(pXY , pZ|XY ) is right continuous at  = 0. This can be proved (using continuity of mutual information
and continuity of L1-norm) along the lines of a similar inequality (inequality (14)) in [13].
APPENDIX E
DETAILS OMITTED FROM SUBSECTION III-A
Proof of Claim 1. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose ~α(y)i 6= ~α(y
′)
j and U (y)i ∩ U (y
′)
j 6= φ. Let u ∈
U (y)i ∩U (y
′)
j . Define two sets Supp(~α
(y)
i ) = {x ∈ X : ~α(y)i (x) > 0} and Supp(~α(y
′)
j ) = {x ∈ X : ~α(y
′)
j (x) >
0}. We analyze two cases, one when these two sets are equal, and the other, when they are not.
Case 1. Supp(~α(y)i ) = Supp(~α
(y′)
j ): since ~α
(y)
i and ~α
(y′)
j are distinct probability vectors with same
support, there must exist x and x′ such that ~α(y)i (x) > 0, ~α
(y′)
j (x) > 0, ~α
(y)
i (x
′) > 0, ~α(y
′)
j (x
′) > 0, and
~α
(y)
i (x
′)
~α
(y)
i (x)
6= ~α
(y′)
j (x
′)
~α
(y′)
j (x)
. Since ~α(y)i (x) > 0, ~α
(y)
i (x
′) > 0, we have pZ|XY (z|x, y) > 0 and pZ|XY (z|x′, y) > 0
for every z ∈ Z(y)i . Similarly, since ~α(y
′)
j (x) > 0, ~α
(y′)
j (x
′) > 0, we have pZ|XY (z′|x, y′) > 0 and
pZ|XY (z′|x′, y′) > 0 for every z′ ∈ Z(y
′)
j . Note that
~α
(y)
i (x
′)
~α
(y)
i (x)
=
pZ|XY (z|x′,y)
pZ|XY (z|x,y) and
~α
(y′)
j (x
′)
~α
(y′)
j (x)
=
pZ|XY (z′|x′,y′)
pZ|XY (z′|x,y′) ,
where, by hypothesis, pZ|XY (z|x
′,y)
pZ|XY (z|x,y) 6=
pZ|XY (z′|x′,y′)
pZ|XY (z′|x,y′) .
Since u ∈ U (y)i , there exists z ∈ Z(y)i such that p(u, z|y) > 0. This implies – by privacy against Bob –
that p(u, z|x, y) > 0 and p(u, z|x′, y) > 0. Consider pUZ|XY (u, z|x, y) and expand it as follows:
pUZ|XY (u, z|x, y) = pZ|XY (z|x, y)pU |XY Z(u|x, y, z)
= pZ|XY (z|x, y)pU |Y Z(u|y, z) (54)
Since pUZ|XY (u, z|x, y) > 0, all the terms above are non-zero and well-defined. In the last equality we
used privacy against Bob to write pU |XY Z(u|x, y, z) = pU |Y Z(u|y, z). Now expand pUZ|XY (u, z|x, y) in
another way as follows:
pUZ|XY (u, z|x, y) = pU |XY (u|x, y)pZ|UXY (z|u, x, y)
= pU |XY (u|x)pZ|UY (z|u, y) (55)
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Again, all the terms above are non-zero and well-defined because pUZ|XY (u, z|x, y) > 0. We used U −
X−Y to write pU |XY (u|x, y) = pU |X(u|x) and Z−(U, Y )−X to write pZ|UXY (z|u, x, y) = pZ|UY (z|u, y)
in (55). Now comparing (54) and (55) gives the following:
pZ|XY (z|x, y)pU |Y Z(u|y, z) = pU |X(u|x)pZ|UY (z|u, y) (56)
Since pUZ|XY (u, z|x′, y) > 0, we can apply the same arguments as above with pUZ|XY (u, z|x′, y) and get
the following:
pZ|XY (z|x′, y)pU |Y Z(u|y, z) = pU |X(u|x′)pZ|UY (z|u, y) (57)
Note that all the terms on both sides of (56) and (57) are non-zero. Dividing (56) by (57) gives the
following:
pZ|XY (z|x, y)
pZ|XY (z|x′, y) =
pU |X(u|x)
pU |X(u|x′) . (58)
Similarly, since u ∈ U (y′)j , there exists z′ ∈ Z(y
′)
j such that p(u, z
′|y′) > 0. This implies – by privacy against
Bob – that p(u, z′|x, y′) > 0 and p(u, z′|x′, y′) > 0. Applying the above arguments with p(u, z′|x, y′) > 0
and p(u, z′|x′, y′) > 0 gives
pZ|XY (z′|x, y′)
pZ|XY (z′|x′, y′) =
pU |X(u|x)
pU |X(u|x′) . (59)
Comparing (58) and (59) gives pZ|XY (z|x,y)
pZ|XY (z|x′,y) =
pZ|XY (z′|x,y′)
pZ|XY (z′|x′,y′) , which is a contradiction.
Case 2. Supp(~α(y)i ) 6= Supp(~α(y
′)
j ): assume, without loss of generality, that Supp(~α
(y)
i )\Supp(~α(y
′)
j ) 6= φ.
Let x ∈ Supp(~α(y)i ) \ Supp(~α(y
′)
j ). This implies that ~α
(y)
i (x) > 0 and ~α
(y′)
j (x) = 0. Since Supp(~α
(y′)
j ) 6= φ
(because ~α(y
′)
j is not a zero vector), there exists x
′ ∈ Supp(~α(y′)j ) such that ~α(y
′)
j (x
′) > 0. Note that
~α
(y)
i (x) > 0 implies pZ|XY (z|x, y) > 0 for every z ∈ Z(y)i ; ~α(y
′)
j (x) = 0 implies pZ|XY (z
′|x, y′) = 0 for
every z′ ∈ Z(y′)j ; and ~α(y
′)
j (x
′) > 0 implies pZ|XY (z′|x′, y′) > 0 for every z′ ∈ Z(y
′)
j . Since u ∈ U (y)i ∩U (y
′)
j ,
there exists z ∈ Z(y)i and z′ ∈ Z(y
′)
j such that p(u, z|y) > 0 and p(u, z′|y′) > 0. These imply – by privacy
against Bob – that p(u, z|x, y) > 0 and p(u, z′|x′, y′) > 0. Now consider p(u, z′|x, y′) and expand it as
follows:
p(u, z′|x, y′) = p(u|x, y′)p(z′|x, y′, u) (60)
= p(u|x)p(z′|y′, u) (61)
We used the Markov chain U−X−Y to write p(u|x, y′) = p(u|x), where p(u|x) > 0 because p(u, z|x, y) >
0. We used the Markov chain Z− (Y, U)−X to write p(z′|x, y′, u) = p(z′|y′, u) in (60), which is greater
than zero because p(u, z′|x′, y′) > 0. Putting all these together in (61) gives p(u, z′|x, y′) > 0, which
implies pZ|XY (z′|x, y′) > 0, a contradiction.
Proof of Claim 2. Since the Markov chain U −X−Y holds, we have that the set of messages that Alice
sends to Bob are same for all inputs of Bob. Now it follows from Claim 1 that for every y ∈ Y we can
partition the set of all possible messages U as follows: U = U (y)1
⊎U (y)2 ⊎ . . .⊎U (y)k(y), where U (y)i is as
defined earlier in (24). Consider any two y, y′ ∈ Y . We have
U = U (y)1
⊎
U (y)2
⊎
. . .
⊎
U (y)k(y) = U (y
′)
1
⊎
U (y′)2
⊎
. . .
⊎
U (y′)k(y′). (62)
First observe that k(y) = k(y′). Otherwise, there exists i ∈ [k(y)] and j ∈ [k(y′)] such that U (y)i ∩U (y
′)
j 6= φ
and ~α(y)i 6= ~α(y
′)
j , which contradicts Claim 1. From now on we denote k(y) by k for every y ∈ Y .
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One-round secure protocol
Input: Alice has x ∈ X and Bob has y ∈ Y .
Output: Bob outputs z with probability pZ|XY (z|x, y).
Protocol
1) Both Alice and Bob agree on an element in the alphabet Y , say y1, beforehand.
2) Alice sends ui to Bob with probability
∑
z∈Z(y)i
pZ|XY (z|x, y1).
3) Upon receiving ui, Bob fixes any element x′ for which α
(y)
i (x
′) > 0, and outputs z with probability
pZ|XY (z|x′,y)∑
z∈Z(y)
i
pZ|XY (z|x′,y) .
Fig. 3 A one-round secure protocol.
Suppose {~α(y)1 , ~α(y)2 , . . . , ~α(y)k } 6= {~α(y
′)
1 , ~α
(y′)
2 , . . . , ~α
(y′)
k }. It means that there exists an i ∈ [k] such
that ~α(y)i /∈ {~α(y
′)
1 , ~α
(y′)
2 , . . . , ~α
(y′)
k }. Since U (y)i is associated with ~α(y)i , we have by (62) that U (y)i /∈
U (y′)1
⊎U (y′)2 ⊎ . . .⊎U (y′)k . This contradicts (62).
Proof of Theorem 3. ⇒: (1) has been shown in Claim 2. (2) follows from the following argument: take
any x ∈ X and consider the following set of equalities:∑
z∈Z(y)i
pZ|XY (z|x, y) (a)=
∑
u∈Ui
pU |XY (u|x, y) (b)=
∑
u∈Ui
pU |XY (u|x, y′) (c)=
∑
z∈Z(y′)i
pZ|XY (z|x, y′),
where (a) and (c) follow from the fact that Bob’s output Z belongs to Z(y)i , when his input is y (or
belongs to Z(y′)i , when his input is y′) if and only if the message U that Alice sends to Bob belongs to
Ui. (b) follows from the Markov chain U −X − Y .
⇐: we show this direction by giving a secure protocol in Figure 3. Now we prove that this protocol is
perfectly secure, i.e., it satisfies perfect correctness and perfect privacy.
Correctness: suppose the protocol of Figure 3 produces an output according to the p.m.f. p(z|x, y). We
show below that p(z|xy) is equal to pZ|XY (z|x, y).
p(z|x, y) = p(z, ui|x, y) (63)
= p(ui|x, y)× p(z|ui, x, y)
= p(ui|x)× p(z|ui, y) (64)
=
( ∑
z∈Z(y)i
pZ|XY (z|x, y1)
)
×
( pZ|XY (z|x′, y)∑
z∈Z(y)i
pZ|XY (z|x′, y)
)
(65)
=
( ∑
z∈Z(y)i
pZ|XY (z|x, y)
)
×
( pZ|XY (z|x, y)∑
z∈Z(y)i
pZ|XY (z|x, y)
)
(66)
= pZ|XY (z|x, y)
In (63) we assume that z ∈ Z(y)i ; and (63) is an equality because the message that Alice sends to Bob
is a deterministic function of Bob’s input and output. In (64) we used the Markov chain U −X − Y to
write p(ui|x, y) = p(ui|x) and Z − (U, Y )−X to write p(z|ui, x, y) = p(z|ui, y). In (65) we substituted
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the values of p(ui|x, y) and p(z|ui, y) from the protocol of Figure 3. In (66) we used the facts that∑
z∈Z(y)i
pZ|XY (z|x, y1) =
∑
z∈Z(y)i
pZ|XY (z|x, y) (which follows from the assumption – see the second
item in the theorem statement) and pZ|XY (z|x
′,y)∑
z∈Z(y)
i
pZ|XY (z|x′,y) =
pZ|XY (z|x,y)∑
z∈Z(y)
i
pZ|XY (z|x,y) (which follows from the fact
that the matrix A(y)i = ~α
(y)
i × ~γ(y)i , defined earlier, is a rank-one matrix).
Privacy: we need to show that if pZ|XY (z|x1, y) > 0 and pZ|XY (z|x2, y) > 0 for some x1, x2, y, z, then
for every ui, p(ui|x1, y, z) = p(ui|x2, y, z) must hold. This follows because p(ui|x, y, z) = 1{z∈Z(y)i }, i.e.,
ui is a deterministic function of (y, z) and is independent of Alice’s input.
Proof of Theorem 4. Lemma 1 states that (pXY , pZ|XY ) is computable with asymptotic security if and
only if it is computable with perfect security, i.e., (pXY , pZ|XY ) is computable with asymptotic security
if and only if there exists p(u, x, y, z) = pXY Z(x, y, z)p(u|x, y, z) that satisfies (3)-(4)). To prove this
theorem, we use the characterization of securely computable (pXY , pZ|XY ) with perfect security (where
pXY has full support) from Theorem 3. First we give achievability and then prove converse. Although the
general achievability of Theorem 1 is applicable here, we give a more direct achievability proof based on
the Slepian-Wolf coding scheme, with a much simpler argument of its correctness and privacy.
Achievability: Alice and Bob get Xn and Y n, respectively, as their inputs, where (Xi, Yi) are distributed
i.i.d. according to pXY . Alice passes Xn through the virtual DMC pW |X and obtains an i.i.d. sequence W n,
where pW |X is obtained from (25). Note that if Bob gets access to this W n sequence exactly, and he outputs
an i.i.d. sequence Zn by passing (W n, Y n) through the virtual DMC pZ|WY , where pZ|WY is obtained
from (25), then perfect correctness is achieved, i.e., Bob’s output Zn will be distributed exactly according
to Πni=1pZ|XY (zi|xi, yi). We show below that conveying W n to Bob also maintains privacy against Bob.
So, the goal is for Alice to convey this W n sequence to Bob reliably. Since W n may be correlated with
Y n, Alice can use the Slepian-Wolf coding scheme to convey W n to Bob at a rate H(W |Y ). Now we
show that this scheme is asymptotically secure, i.e., it satisfies asymptotic correctness (1) and asymptotic
privacy (2). In the analysis below, E is an indicator random variable which is equal to 1 if Bob recovers
the intended W n exactly, and 0 otherwise. Let ′ := Pr{E = 1}, then by the correctness of Slepian-Wolf
coding scheme we have that ′ → 0 as n→∞. Note that if E = 0, i.e., Bob recovers the intended W n
exactly, then pZˆn|XnY n = pZn|XnY n .
Correctness: Note that Bob makes an error only when he does not decode the intended W n sequence
exactly; and that happens with probability ′, which goes to 0 as n tends to infinity. This implies that our
scheme satisfies ‖pXnY nZˆn − pXnY nZn‖1 → 0 as n→∞.
Privacy: We show that our scheme satisfies I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zˆn) ≤ n′′, where ′′ → 0 as n→∞.
I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zˆn) = I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zˆn, Wˆ n(Y n, Zˆn)) (67)
≤ I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zˆn, Wˆ n(Y n, Zˆn), E) +H(E) (68)
= ′ × I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zˆn, Wˆ n(Y n, Zˆn), E = 1)
+ (1− ′)× I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zˆn, Wˆ n(Y n, Zˆn), E = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= I(M ;Xn|Y n,Zˆn,Wn,E=0) = 0
+H2(
′) (69)
≤ ′ × n× log |X |+H2(′) (70)
≤ n′′, where ′′ → 0 as n→∞.
In our achievability scheme, Bob first decodes Wˆ n from (M,Y n) and then samples Zˆn. Note that the
same Wˆ n can be recovered from (Y n, Zˆn). Let Wˆ : Y × Zˆ → [k] – note that [k] is the alphabet of
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W – be the function by which we recover Wˆ from (Y, Zˆ). In (67), the Wˆ n(Y n, Zˆn) vector is equal to
the Wˆ n vector that Bob decodes from (Y n, Zˆn). In (68), we used the following information inequality:
I(A;B|C) ≤ I(A;B|C,D)+H(D) for any random variables A,B,C,D, which can be proved as follows:
I(A;B|C) ≤ I(A;B,D|C)
≤ I(A;D|C) + I(A;B|C,D)
≤ H(D) + I(A;B|C,D).
In (69), I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zˆn,W n, E = 0) = 0, because M is a determinisitc function of W n; and H2(.)
denotes the binary entropy function. In (70) we used I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zˆn, Wˆ n(Y n, Zˆn), E = 1) ≤ log |X |n.
Since X is finite, ′′ → 0 as ′ → 0.
Converse: If pXY has full support, then we can simplify the expression in (23). Note that pUZ|XY
in (23) satisfies (3)-(5), which means that pUZ|XY computes (pXY , pZ|XY ) with perfect security. This
implies that the random variable W is a function of U as well as of (Y, Z) (see the comments before
Theorem 4). Now, we can lower-bound the objective function in (23) by H(W |Y ) as follows: I(Z;U |Y ) =
I(Z,W ;U,W |Y ) ≥ H(W |Y ). Note that U = W satisfies all the Markov chains in (23). Thus, if pXY
has full support, then we can identify U as W .
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
As stated in the beginning of Section III, the cardinality bound of |U| ≤ |X | · |Y| · |Z|+ 2 follows from
the Fenchel-Eggleston’s strengthening of Carathéodory’s theorem [17, pg. 310].
Converse: For every  > 0, there is a large enough n and a code Cn that satisfies the following
properties:
M −Xn − Y n,
Zˆn − (M,Y n)−Xn,
‖pXnY nZˆn − pXnY nZn‖1 ≤ .
Now we follow the converse of Theorem 1 exactly (except for the privacy part) up to (23), which gives
the following:
R ≥ min
pU|XY Z :
U−X−Y
Z−(U,Y )−X
I(X,Z;U |Y )− 4 − δ,
where 4 + δ → 0 as n→∞.
Achievability: This is simpler than the achievability of Theorem 1 as we do not need to worry
about privacy here. We follow the proof of achievability of Theorem 1 (given in Appendix C) with
two modifications: (i) pUXY Z does not need to satisfy the Markov chain U − (Y, Z)−X in protocol A,
and (ii) we do not need to show that pˆ(xn, yn, zn,m|f) satisfies privacy condition in part (3). With this
we have the following constraints on rates R′ and RM (similar to (31) and (33)):
R′ < H(U |X, Y, Z), (71)
R′ +RM > H(U |Y ). (72)
Now it follows that, for every RM > I(X,Z;U |Y ), there exists R′ > 0 such that R′ < H(U |X, Y, Z)
and RM + R′ > H(U |Y ) hold, which implies existence of a coding scheme by the above analysis with
rate RM . We can define a set of appropriate encoder and decoder similar to how we defined them at the
end of the achievability proof of Theorem 1.
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